# Physical Security: An Overview from Deadbolts to Deathtraps

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#### Disclaimer

- This presentation is for educational purposes only.
- I am not a lawyer even if I sound like one. Seek legal advice from someone who is.





#### Overview

- Introduction
- Basic Security
- Breaking/Fixing Basic Security
- RFID
- Closing Points to Remember





### About Cody Hofstetter



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### Death of the Dino









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**vm**ware

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#### yubico


























#### Red Eye Audience Participation



































# Deadbolts








# Deadbolts







# Deadbolts







### Fail-Safe Vs Fail-Secure

- Fail-Safe (aka Fail-Open)
  - -A device will not endanger lives or property when it fails
- Fail-Secure (aka Fail-Closed)
  - Access or data will not enter an adversary's hands in a failure





#### Fail-Safe Vs Fail-Secure

- E.g. a building catches fire
  - -Fail-Safe systems unlock doors to allow firefighters and quick escape
  - -Fail-Secure systems lock doors to prevent unauthorized access





# Dead Latch








# Strike Plate





# Dead Latch Engaging

**Dead Latches** 







# Lockpicking

- Not at all how it happens in the movies
- •NOT illegal to own tools or practice
- A single lock can take anywhere from seconds to hours depending upon its complexity (visit TOOOL)
- Any real engagement will likely involve the use of bypass tools





# Lockpicking

- Bypass tools:
  - Bump keys
  - Snap gun
  - Crash bar
  - Mouth

D.D.T



Odd's are if you don't know what this is .... you shouldn't have one





# Hinge Removal







### Jamb Pins



MAJOR MFG.

JAMB PINS FOR RESIDENTIAL DOORS



3

product reviews

YOUR PRICE:

\$3.95

SXU:

MS-jP-10

SHIPPING:


Calculated at checkout

CURRENT STOCK:

Out of stock



# Jamb Pins





# Crash Bars







# Request to Exit






# REX Bypass







### Modern Door Handles








### Under Door Attacks

**Under Door Attacks** 





### Under Door Prevention

Under Door Attack Prevention — Security Door Bottom

Under Door Attack Prevention - Blocking Clips





# Padlocks







### Padlocks





## Padlock Shims





# Padlock Shims - DIY





# Padlocks







#### Padlock Shims - DIY

- Do NOT practice on locks you depend on
- •Do NOT practice on locks you can't open
- •Your shims <u>WILL</u> break. If you cannot open it, you may render the lock inoperable





# High Security Padlocks

- •Use techniques that make shimming impossible
- •Most common is ball bearings instead of spring loaded catch
- Indentation on shackle is round instead of wedge-shaped





## Electronic Credentials

Attacking Electronic Credentials





# Proxmark 3





#### Proxmark 3

- Open Source Design
- Operates in:
  - -Low Frequency (LF) 125KHz
  - High Frequecny (HF) 13.56MHz
- •Reader AND Tag





## Garage Openers

- Started as simple transmitter and receiver design (but opened neighbors as well)
- •Second iteration used approx 4,096 codes
  - -Small enough that unsophisticated attackers could go through a neighborhood and check





## Garage Openers

- Iteration 2.5
  - -Remotes preprogrammed to roughly 3.5 billion unique codes
- Third iteration uses frequency spectrum between 300-400MHz and rolling code (code hopping)
  - -Also transmits a unique identifier for the remote control, sequence number, and sometimes an encrypted message





# Garage Openers

•Standards used by Chamberlain, LiftMaster, and Craftsman

Dates	System
1984-1993	8-12 DIP switch on 300-400 MHz
1993-1997	Billion Code on 390 MHz
1997-2005	Security+ (rolling code) on 390 MHz
2005-present	Security+ (rolling code) on 315 MHz
2011-present	Security+ 2.0 (rolling code) on 310, 315, and 390 MHz





# Car Security

•First remote keyless system introduced

on...



•1984 Renault Fuego





## Car Security

- Smart Key
  - -Introduced by Mercedes-Benz as "Key-less Go" in 1998 on W220 S-Class
- Vulnerable to "Replay" attacks





#### Hacker Tools

- HackRF One \$300
- UberTooth One \$120
- Raspberry Pi 3 B+ \$35
- Kali Linux \$0











### Faraday Cage

- Enclosure used to prevent electromagnetic fields
- Formed by a continuous (or mesh) conductive material
- External field causes electric charges within the conducting material to be distributed, canceling the field's effect in the cage's interior (and vice versa)







### Faraday Bags

 Used by Law Enforcement to prevent signals (such as dead man switches) from reaching a device (i.e. a remote

wipe)







### CIA Op-Sec Fail

- Italy convicts 23 Americans for 2003 CIA rendition (practice of abducting and transferring individuals to third countries for detention and "interrogation")
- UN considers these as "crimes against humanity"
- Metadata examination revealed relationship between multiple operatives





#### CIA Op-Sec Fail

How was the relationship established?

 Operatives were supposed to used lined bags to prevent cell signals when not in











- Wickr/Telegram/WhatsApp
- Secure Messaging App
- Encrypted communications (end to end and perfect forward secrecy)
- Disappearing messages





#### Want to hire me?

- Pentest your organization
- Give talks
- Teach how to enhance your privacy
- Train your staff to make your company more secure





### Thank you

**Closing points to remember:** 

Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they aren't after you

Use FOSS & tell everybody

**Email:** 

Slides@SovereignCyberIndustries.com

